Single Question. Whether a Creature can have any Action with respect to the Term of Creation

2. We proceed thus to the first question. The argument is that a creature cannot have any action with respect to the term of creation.

3. The first evidence is from Augustine On John tr.80 n.3, and it is in Gratian Decretum p.2 cause 1 q.1 ch.54: “What is this virtue of the water? It is so great that it touches the body and washes the heart.” But the heart, that is, the soul, is not washed save by grace; therefore the baptismal water is disposed with effective causality for the grace which washes the heart.

4. Again, Augustine 83 Questions q.78, “Artisans are not able to fashion anything from nothing for the reason that they work through the body.” Therefore, by opposition, the spiritual creature is able to produce something from nothing, because it does not work through the body.

5. And there is a confirmation, that just as an outward action requires some passive object on which to act, so it seems that an immanent action does not require a passive object. Therefore the agent can act with an immanent action and not on any passive object. So it can create.

6. Again by reason as follows:

An effect that does not equal the power of a higher agent can be produced by a lower agent. But no effect lower than the highest creature is equal to the power of God (this is plain about equality simply [cf. II d.3 n.333]). Nor is such effect equal in idea of effect, because something still higher than it can be produced and be the effect of God.   Therefore anything lower than the highest creature can be produced by some second agent. But there is some such lower thing, which can only be produced by creation. Therefore etc     .

7. Proof of the major: if the effect in idea of effect does not equal the power of the agent, then the agent does not produce it according to its whole power, and so a lesser power would suffice for producing it. And there is a confirmation of this, and a proof of the consequence in the proof of the major. For if it were to produce a lower effect with its whole power, then a higher effect would not show a greater power or perfection in the cause than an inferior one would. For the lower effect, by the fact that it cannot be produced by the cause save according to the cause’s total power, shows the whole of the cause’s power or perfection. The consequent is false, for a more perfect effect shows more the power of the cause.

8. Again, a created agent can annihilate something; so it can also create something. The proof of the consequence is that there is as much distance from nothing to something as from something to nothing, as is plain from the Philosopher Physics 3.3.202b10-14, “There is the same distance from Athens     etc .”; therefore      an equal virtue has power for this distance just as for that.

9. Proof of the antecedent [n.8]:

First because a created agent can destroy a natural form totally so that nothing of it remains; but such destruction of a thing is an annihilation of it.

Second because that which can be the effective cause of one opposite (in the way it belongs to the opposite to have an effective cause) can be the destructive cause of the other opposite (a fact plain from the incompossibility of opposites). But the soul can be the cause of infidelity, of despair, and of other mortal sins, which are repugnant to grace and charity. I say ‘cause’ in the sense in which it belongs to these sins to have an effective cause, namely in failing; for it is plain that they can exist in the soul, and not from God as cause, for God is not the cause of sin. Therefore the soul can be a cause corruptive of faith, hope, and charity or grace. But the destruction of all these things is annihilation, just as their production is creation. For universally, what can only be produced if it is created is only destroyed if it is annihilated, and that faith and infidelity, and hope and despair, are opposed seems manifest. A similar proof is given about grace, or charity, or any mortal sin, for friendship and enmity with God are opposites. A sinner is formally an enemy of God, but he who has grace and charity is formally a friend of God;     therefore etc     .

10. Again, a second cause can do more by virtue of the first cause than by its own virtue, otherwise it would not essentially depend on the first cause in causing - which is unacceptable. But a second cause has, by its own virtue, power for any being that can be produced without creation. Therefore it has power, by virtue of the first cause, for the term of creation.

11. On the contrary:

Augustine Literal Commentary on Genesis 11.21 ch.15, “Angels are altogether incapable of creating any nature.” And ibid. ch.27, “No angel can create nature, just as an angel cannot create itself either.”

12. Again Damascene Orthodox Faith ch.17, “Those who say that angels are creators of any nature are the mouth of their father, the devil.”

13. Again Augustine City of God 12.25 says, speaking of the angels, “We as much say that they are not creators of animals as that they are not farmers of fruits and crops.”

14. Again Augustine On the Trinity 3.8 n.14, “We cannot say that angels are creators just as we cannot say that men are creators of crops.” And 9 n.18, “He alone is creator who principally forms things, with whom are from the beginning all things that are in number, weight, and measure.”

I. Opinion of the Theologians, who Hold to the Negative Side of the Question

15. In this question theologians commonly hold to the negative side.

A. The Four Reasons they Bring Forward

16. They set down arguments for this conclusion - for present purposes four.

1. First Reason, which is from Thomas Aquinas

17. The first reason is taken from the side of the term per se of creation, and it is as follows [ST Ia q.45 a.5]: “It is necessary to reduce effects more universal to causes more universal; but the most universal of all effects is being itself; therefore it is the proper effect of the most universal or supreme cause. Hence it is said in On Causes [prop.3 nn.27-28] that neither the intelligence nor the rational soul bestows being save as they operate with divine operation.” From this is further deduced, “Since the production of being absolutely (and not this or that being) pertains to the idea of creation, therefore is creation the proper action of God.”

18. The addition is also made that creation cannot belong instrumentally or ministerially to a creature. The reason is that “an instrumental cause does not participate in the action of the superior cause unless its working for the proper effect of the principal agent is through something proper to itself.” The proof is that “if it did nothing according to anything proper to itself it would be applied in vain to the action. Nor would there need to be determinate instruments for determinate actions, just as we see also that an axe in cutting wood gets from the property of its own form that it produce the form of the bench, which is the effect of the principal agent.” But it cannot be like this in creation, because creation does not rest on anything presupposed that could be made ready by the action of an instrumental agent. For “absolute being, which is an effect proper to God, is presupposed to everything else.”

2. Second Reason

19. The second principal reason is taken from the distance between the terms of creation, and it is as follows [e.g. Matthew of Aquasparta, Albert, Richard of Middleton, Henry of Ghent]: only an infinite power can extend over an infinite distance; but between the terms ‘from which’ and ‘to which’ of creation, namely between nothing and being, there is an infinite distance;     therefore etc     .

20. Proof of the major: the greater the distance the more difficult it is to traverse it and the greater the virtue required in the agent; for we see universally that the more that potentiality is distant from act the greater the power required of the agent to reduce it to act.

21. Proof of the minor: for any finite distance it is possible to take or understand a greater; but no greater distance can be understood than that between nothing and being.

22. The minor is confirmed because the distance between all contradictories is equal; therefore the distance between nothing and something is equal to the distance between God and not-God; but the distance between God and not-God is infinite; therefore it is infinite between other contradictories too.

23. Again, the minor is confirmed in another way, because the distance between two contradictories is equal to the distance between any contradictories. But between the totality of being and pure nothing there is an infinite distance (in the way that it is possible for infinites to be contained under the totality of being), and such that only an infinite power is able to traverse it. So there is an equal distance between soul and not-soul or any creatable thing and its negation.

24. From this middle term [n.19] the argument for the conclusion is formed in another way as follows: there is no proportion between no-power and some power, as neither between not-being and being; therefore there is no proportion between the distance of power from act and the distance of no-power from act; therefore there will be no proportion between the power that can traverse the latter distance and the power that can traverse the former.

3. Third Reason

25. The third reason is taken from the order of agent causes [e.g. William of Ware, Giles of Rome], and it is as follows: An inferior agent presupposes in its acting the effect of a superior agent. This is clear from induction, because art presupposes the effect of nature that it acts on, and nature presupposes something potential, namely matter, which is the effect of the principal agent. If the order of agents requires this universally, and there cannot be any created agent that is not subordinate to God in acting, then a created agent necessarily presupposes in its acting an effect of God, and so it cannot act if nothing is presupposed, and therefore it cannot create.

4. Fourth Reason

26, The fourth reason is taken from the potentiality of a created agent [e.g. William of Ware, Giles of Rome], and it is as follows: no created agent is pure act or pure being; therefore none of its actions is pure act but has something of potentiality in it; but second act, being mixed with potency, is not without motion or change [cf. Ord. I d.2 n.311-312, II d.1 nn.315-316]; therefore no created agent can act without motion and change; therefore it cannot create, for creation is from nothing but motion is in a subject.

B. The Inefficacy of the Aforesaid Reasons

27. But these reasons do not seem to be necessarily conclusive.

1. About the First Reason

28. The first [nn.17-24] does not for it consists principally in these two propositions: ‘being simply is the effect of God’, and ‘being simply is the proper term of creation’.

29. The first proposition seems false, because any efficient cause that generates a composite is also efficient cause of the being of the composite. But some composites are generated by created causes, unless the whole action of created things is to be taken away;     therefore etc     .

30. Proof of the major:

First because, according to the Philosopher in Physics 5.1.225a15-16, generation is generation to being.

31. Second by reason, because it is by the action of whatever generates a composite that the form of the composite exists in matter. But a form’s being in matter is the composite’s possession of being. Otherwise its being will either naturally follow or naturally precede the composite that is the term of the generation. If it precedes then the being of the composite exists before the composite itself does, which is not intelligible. If it follows, then a composite could, without contradiction, be produced by an agent without God giving being to that composite; indeed God could simply not give being, since he acts only contingently outside himself.

32. Nor does it help to imagine that being does not come from what generates the composite but yet necessarily accompanies the composite, for according to you [n.18] it does not accompany it as the term of the action of the generator itself. So, if being accompanies the composite as term of the first agent and does not precede it (as is plain), then it follows the composite, and so it can, without contradiction, not follow it.

33. The proofs too of this now disproved proposition [n.28, ‘being simply is the proper effect of God’] are not valid:

For the reason adduced for the purpose [n.17] fails in that it is equivocal, or that one or other premise is false. For ‘more universal cause’ can be understood in two ways, namely as to virtue or perfection, or as to predication. Likewise too an effect can be said to be ‘more universal’ in two ways, namely in predication or in virtue or perfection. And that is said to be ‘more universal in predication’ whose idea is predicated of more things; and that is said to be ‘more universal in perfection’ whose perfection is greater in itself and contains more perfections.

34. If then in the major premise [‘It is necessary to reduce effects more universal to causes more universal’] ‘more universal’ is taken in the same way for both cause and effect, I concede the major. For a more common effect can be reduced to a more common cause, and a more perfect effect requires a more perfect cause (if there can be a more perfect cause).

35. But if in the major ‘more universal’ is taken as ‘more universal in perfection’ for both cause and effect, there is equivocation, or the minor [‘the most universal of all effects is being itself’] is false. For the minor is only true of universality in predication (as is evident), for being is not the most perfect effect, for what is included in many things cannot be more perfect than any of the things in which it is included.a So the conclusion that follows is that the effect is reduced to a cause more universal in predication.

a.a [Interpolation] but being is included in any effect, however imperfect;     therefore etc     . But if in the major and minor ‘more universal’ is taken as ‘more universal’ in predication, then both are true and the conclusion is...

36. But then further ‘God is of this sort’ [sc. ‘God is the most universal cause’— added in the argument by Thomas but left implied above by Scotus], the minor is false. Indeed, God is the most universal cause in perfection, but being is the most universal cause in predication. And then the conclusion can only be that being can only be the effect of being, which I concede.a

a.a [Interpolation] But if ‘more universal’ in both premises is taken for ‘more universal in perfection’, then the major is true and the minor is false, as is plain from what has been said; indeed, the effect most universal in perfection is the noblest of creatable things.

37. But if in the major ‘more universal’ is taken in different senses, namely different on the side of the cause and effect (as that on the side of the effect it is taken for ‘more universal in predication’ and on the side of the cause for ‘more universal in perfection’), the major is false. For an effect more universal in predication can be from an imperfect cause, since being is found in several imperfect effects.

38. The other proof [n.17], taken from the author of On Causes, establishes the opposite. For it does not absolutely deny that being is given by the intelligence to something; rather it affirms it the more, because it says that to give being only belongs to the intelligence insofar as the intelligence operates through divine operation.

39. Even if addition to the proposition from On Causes be made through proposition 4, ‘The first of created things is being’, the conclusion, that being is precisely the term of creation, does not follow. For according to some people, ‘being’ there is taken for the first intelligence next to God, and ‘creation’ is taken there in extended sense for the first production of things in their idea, and firstness of being is taken according to distinction of formal ideas in effect and in origin, and not in perfection, so that the sense is: in the way that ‘being’ in the effect is distinguished from essential perfections, being is the term of the first production of things in their idea.

40. It is said here [n.33], in confirmation of the argument about more universal cause and effect, that it must be understood of an effect more universal in predication, and insofar as it is thus more universal. For (it is said) an effect more universal in predication, insofar as it is such, can only come from a cause more universal in perfection. For although a man can come from a man, yet man insofar as he is ‘man’ cannot come to be save from a cause more perfect than the whole species of man. Therefore, by similarity, ‘being’ insofar as it is such cannot come to be save from a cause more universal in perfection than the whole of creatable being. But being, insofar as it is such, is the term of creation. Hence too is it then first said that being, not as this or that sort of being but simply, is the term of creation [n.17].

41. This confirmation does not work. For it is a response [n.40] posited by the doctor (whose it is) in his question ‘whether it belongs only to God to create’ [n.17]. I presume that he does not mean to ask ‘whether it belongs only to God to create everything creatable’, because this question would then include ‘whether anything else other than God could create itself’, about which no one could ever have doubted, according to Augustine On the Trinity I.1 n.1. Therefore, he means to ask some other doubtful question or conclusion, namely ‘whether anything other than God could create at least something lower than itself’. And about the question or conclusion thus understood he holds, for the reason posited [n.17], the negative side.

42. Let the major then be taken according to this exposition: ‘an effect more universal in predication, insofar as it is such, is from a cause more universal in perfection’; being is of this sort; the conclusion follows: ‘therefore being, insofar as it is such’ or (to give him more for his purpose) ‘therefore creatable being, insofar as it is such, can only be from a cause more universal in perfection than the whole of creatable being.’ From this it does not follow that ‘therefore the being of this creatable thing can only be from such a cause’. For it is plain that in this inference there is a fallacy of the consequent.Sc. The argument proceeds invalidly from a premise about being simply to a conclusion about this or that sort of being in particular. ¹ Therefore, according to this exposition of the first reason, the question is either nothing or, if it raises a doubt and the negative side is held for the reason stated (as thus understood), there is a fallacy of the consequent.

43. But if you say, ‘in any produced thing one is to consider being as it is of this sort and being simply, and in the second way being is the effect of the most universal cause (as the reason proves), but in the first way it is the effect of a particular cause’ -this is not a solution, because the ‘being simply’ in this thing and the ‘being of this sort’ are not so distinguished from each other that the ‘being of this sort’ could be from some cause without the ‘being simply’ in this thing being from the same cause. For whether there is a distinction of reason in the intellect or in any other way, what gives the thing ‘being of this sort’ gives it the ‘being simply’ that is in it.

44. As to what is added also about the instrument [n.18], I say that the major can be understood well or badly.

For when in the major is taken, not that the instrument has its proper action, but that it acts through something proper to itself (and Thomas brings in his proofs for this, which can be conceded), and that yet it does not act through what is proper to it save in virtue of the principal agent (for in any action it may have that is not by virtue of the principal agent, it would not be an instrument in this action but the principal agent) - then it is clear he is taking the instrument to be acting dispositively.

45. But if what is taken in the major is understood universally, it is false, for it is possible (according to him elsewhere [ST IIIa q.62 a.1 ad 2]) that the instrument reach up to the effect of the principal agent. And this is plain in many acts of art, where the artisan sometimes induces through the instrument the term principally intended (as a coin maker stamps the form on the coin through an instrument, and as the seal maker stamps the seal on the wax). Nor is an instrument ever necessary to dispose something for the principal effect, unless it is an instrument in the action that does the disposing for the effect -which is not universally necessary but only when there are several ordered actions, one of which disposes to the other. Absolutely, however, there can be an instrument that is an instrument in the principal action and yet does not concur in any other preceding action.

46. His major then [n.18] cannot be true unless the understanding of it is that an instrument causes, through something proper to itself, a disposition for the principal term - that is, when reaching the principal term is not possible by virtue of the principal agent itself.

47. And then one must suppose in the minor [n.18] that the creature cannot reach the term of creation in virtue of God, and this minor is not proved save by the prior reason about being [n.18], and this reason, as already seen, does not work [nn.38-39, 4243].

48. Nor does the example about the axe [n.18] or the other proofs (that are brought in to show that an instrument has something proper to it through which it acts [n.45]) prove universally that an instrument acts dispositively. An axe acts dispositively for the bench, because the instrument is used in cutting the wood prior to the introducing of the form of the bench. But if the artisan were to use an axe or some other instrument in performing the principal act, it would not be necessary that the instrument (as an instrument for the form of the bench) have some dispositive action.

49. From these examples, then, where he assumes that the instrument disposes something for the principal term, one cannot make this inference about instruments universally without committing a fallacy of the consequent. But if it is not taken universally the idea of creation cannot be removed from the creature, for ‘from a particular major in the second figure nothing follows’, save by a fallacy of the consequent.The argument in n.18 is: (major premise) instruments are things that work dispositively for the principal effect; (minor premise) nothing at work in creation is a thing that works dispositively for the principal effect; (conclusion) therefore nothing at work in creation is an instrument. This syllogism is in the second figure and is only valid if the major premise is universal. But the major premise is false as a universal and only true as a particular. ²

2. About the Second Reason

50. The second principal reason [nn.19-24] does not seem valid, for when the extreme terms are immediate the distance between them is precisely as great as the one extreme is greater than the other.

51. The point is plain in a similar case, for the distance of God from creatures (even from the highest creature that can come to be) is as great as the greatness of God; and therefore, if the highest possible creature were posited, God would still be infinitely distant from it, because God is infinite.

52. It is plain too from an example to the opposite. Distance in quantities arises because of some intervening medium, and so the amount of the distance arises because of the amount of the intervening space. Therefore, by opposition, where there is no intervening medium, the amount of the distance will accord only with the amount of one extreme.

53. This is also plain by reason, for ‘distance’ here [sc. between God and creatures] is nothing but the excess of one extreme over the other. But when the exceeding extreme is immediate to the exceeded extreme, the quantity of the excess is the quantity of the exceeding extreme.

54. On the supposition of this major then [n.50], it is plain that, since some affirmation of creatable being is finite, the distance of this affirmation from the negation will be finite. For it is plain that the distance is immediate, since according to the Philosopher, Posterior Analytics I.2.72a12-13, “contradiction is the opposition of what has no per se middle.”

55. But if you imagine infinity on the part of nothing, this is nothing; because ‘nothing’ is not distant from anything save by deficiency, and the difference of ‘nothing’ from being is no greater than the greatness of the being it is different from.

56. This point too is plain, because there is no distance when one compares nothing with nothing.

57. So therefore the minor of the second reason is false [“between the terms ‘from which’ and ‘to which’ of creation, namely between nothing and being, there is an infinite distance,” n.19], if we understand infinite distance positively, that is, as infinitely exceeding every finite distance.

58. And thus must one understand ‘infinite distance’ in the major [i.e. “only an infinite power can extend over an infinite distance”, n.19] in order for the major to be true. For the infinity of the virtue of the agent that has power for that distance cannot otherwise be proved.

59. The minor [n.19] is disproved also in this way:

For in some contradictions there is a greater distance than in others, because God is distant from non-God more than the soul is distant from non-soul. And no virtue at all can make God from non-God or vice versa. But some virtue can make soul from nonsoul. Now if all contradictions were infinite, no contradiction could be greater than another, since the infinite cannot be exceeded.

60. Again, the virtue that has power for the whole ‘term to which’ has power for the distance between; for, once the ‘term to which’ is in place, the ‘term from which’ is destroyed by the ‘term to which’ that succeeds. But the term is finite, and so one cannot conclude therefrom other than that a finite virtue has power for it; therefore it also has power for the distance between.

61. Again, some natural generation is between form and privation, from Physics 5.1.225a12-16; but privation incudes contradiction (though contradiction in a subject), and so when there is passage from privation to form, there is a passage from negation to affirmation. But it is plain that this natural generation is done by created virtue. Therefore the distance is no problem.

62. How then will the common dictum be preserved that says, ‘between contradictories there is an infinite distance’ [nn. 19-24, 50]?

I reply: this dictum is simply false, taking ‘infinite’ for what infinitely exceeds simply any finite distance whatever. But in another way ‘infinite’ can be taken for ‘indeterminate’, and thus the dictum is true. For no distance is so small that it is not sufficient for contradiction. For however little one draws away from one of the contradictories, one is immediately under the other contradictory. Nor is there any distance so great (even were it possible to be infinitely greater than the greatest) that contradiction does not extend itself to it and to its extremes. And when taking ‘infinite’ in this way in the major [n.19], the major is false.

63. To the proofs, then, for the minor:

As to the first [n.21], when it is said that it is not possible to understand a greater distance than the one cited [sc. a greater than that between nothing and being], I say this is false positively and true permissively. That is to say that some distance does separate things more than some other one does, and that some contradiction does separate things more than some other one does. But the distance in question [between nothing and being] does permit any greatest distance, for it remains true in the greatest distance. An example: the term ‘ass’ indicates greater intensive perfection than the term ‘animal’, yet ‘animal’ permits, or can remain true, in something more perfect than ‘ass’, because it does so in ‘man’. And what is greatest in this way, namely permissively, is not the greatest formally.

64. As to the other proof [n.22], about certain kinds of contradictories, I say that although all contradictories whatever are equally incompossible with each other, yet they are not equally distant. For God is more distant from not-God than white from not-white (the way the first proof [n.21] proceeded), because the positive extreme is greater in comparison to the negation [sc. God is greater than white, though not-God and not-white are equally negations].

65. The same point makes plain the answer to the next proof [n.23]. For the totality of created being exceeds ‘nothing’ more than the soul exceeds not-soul, just as the whole of creatable being is more perfect than the soul. Yet ‘soul combined with not-soul’ is as equally incompossible as ‘nothing combined with the totality of being’. This argument, however, does not support the proposed thesis.

66. As to the reason made next [n.24], about the lack of proportion between nopower and some power, I concede that the distance between no-power and act does not have any proportion to the distance between some power and act. But this is because the latter is a positive distance (because it is between positive extremes) and the former is not a positive distance (because its other extreme is nothing), and there is no proportion of positive to not-positive, just as neither of being to nothing. But from this lack of proportion does not follow that a virtue that can cover one is not proportionate to the virtue that can cover the other. For one positive only lacks proportion with another positive because of infinity in one of the positives. But in the case of the distances in question, the lack of proportion was not because of infinity in one extreme, but because the other extreme did not have any quantity whereby to proportion it. An example: a point lacks proportion with a line because a point has no quantity. To say, then, ‘therefore the virtue that can do this lacks proportion with the virtue that can do that’ is a non sequitur. For a virtue and a virtue are of a nature to have some quantity of the virtue, and consequently to have likewise a proportion between them, unless one of them is infinite. But in the case here [n.24] the lack of proportion is because of a lack of quantity in the other extreme.

3. About the Third Reason

67. The third initial reason [n.25] does not conclude. For either it assumes in the major that the secondary agent presupposes the effect of the first agent as the matter on which it acts, and then it begs the question, namely that every agent other than God acts on some presupposed passive thing. Or it understands the major absolutely, namely that a secondary agent does absolutely presuppose an effect of the first agent, which I concede, because of course it presupposes itself, just as acting presupposes being, and being is the effect of the first agent.

68. As to the induction [n.25], which seems to prove the minor according to the first way of taking the major [n.67], I say that if art has power for some form yet it only has power for some merely accidental form. But an accident necessarily requires a substance for its actual subject. So what follows is not that an artisan (by the fact he is an agent subordinate to nature) requires or presupposes an effect of nature as his own passive subject, but rather that he acts for the sort of term that requires a substance, and art has no power to produce a substance. But it is very plain that this is not because of an order of agents, for nature presupposes in its action an effect of nature as its passive subject, just as in the case of alteration it presupposes a substance. Therefore, there is a common cause on the part of nature and on the part of art in presupposing a substance, namely when they act to produce an accident that can only be produced in a substance.

69. But if some corporeal substance were immediately produced by God without any action of nature, art could nevertheless act on the passivity of it, provided the corporeal substance were capable of the term of the art and provided the effect of nature had preceded in it.

70. It is likewise plain that the argument from the order of agents [n.25], by distinguishing several orders of agents, is not valid. For in the order of natural agent one can find a material agent that is lower and an immaterial agent that is higher. But it does not follow that the material agent presupposes the effect of a created immaterial agent; nor does it follow that, if the material agent presupposes an effect of God immediately on which it acts, therefore the immaterial agent, which is higher, presupposes nothing.

4. About the Fourth Reason

71. The fourth reason [n.26] does not conclude, because the potentiality that is common to creatures (whether it is understood as the creature’s objective potentiality for existence, or whether it is understood as its potentiality as a subject for potentially receiving something or for potentially inhering in a subject, like form or act) is not sufficient for inferring that its action is with motion or change. Rather what follows is that its action, if it is immanent, has the aforesaid potentiality, or that if its action also transitions to another, in the way it does in that which does transition or is in the term of the action, then it has either or both potentialities. But not for this reason does it follow that its act is one that flows or transitions quickly like motion or change.

II. Opinion of Avicenna for the Opposite Side of the Question

A. Exposition of the Opinion

72. The opinion of Avicenna seems to be for the opposite side of the question. He allows that a creature can create in his Metaphysics 9 ch.4, where he posits that the second intelligence is a productive cause of the third, and the third of the fourth, and so on and so on. But the second intelligence is a creature, and the production of the third intelligence is creation, in the way he speaks of creation and creature in Metaphysics 6 ch.2, namely in that creation is production from nothing. And creation comes after nothing, not in order of duration but of nature, as Avicenna expounds in the same place, or it comes from nothing, that is, not from supposing anything first of the produced thing. He posits that in this way the second intelligence is produced by God, and the third by the second - with nothing presupposed and after non-being in order of nature, though not in order of duration, because he does not posit any newness.

73. The following sort of reason can be put together for this opinion: from a cause altogether one there is only one immediate effect (for otherwise there would be no reason for a distinction in the effect; for why is this effect different from that if the cause of this and of that is altogether one?); but the first thing is altogether one in itself; therefore since the intelligences are several, they will not come immediately from one thing; therefore one intelligence comes from another intelligence.

74. If Aristotle agreed with Avicenna here in these two propositions - namely ‘intelligence is produced, that is, it is a being from another, though without novelty’ and ‘from something altogether simple only one thing can immediately come to be’ - then he would have to agree with him in the conclusion.

75. One can also argue for this opinion in the following way, that the Philosopher says in Meterologica 4.3.380a12-15, “Each thing is perfect when it can produce another like itself.” But the intelligences are more perfect than corruptible bodily substances.     Therefore , since body can produce body, much more can intelligence produce intelligence. But an intelligence can only be produced by creation, since it does not have matter as part of itself. Therefore etc     .

B. Refutation of the Opinion

1. The Reason Proposed by Thomas Aquinas.

76. An argument against this opinion is as follows [Aquinas ST Ia q.45 a.5 ad 1]: “What participates in some nature does not produce another like itself in that nature save by applying the nature to something else (for man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely because thus he would be cause of himself; but man is cause that human nature is in ‘this generated man’, and so he presupposes the matter whereby ‘this man’ is). But any created thing participates in the nature of being, because only God is his own being. Therefore no created thing can produce any being unless something is presupposed to its action whereby the product may be a ‘this’. But this sort of supposition cannot hold in the case of an immaterial substance, because an immaterial substance is a ‘this’ through its own form, by which it has being. Therefore, an immaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial substance as to that substance’s ‘being simply’.”

77. This reasoning, which has in some way been rejected elsewhere [Ord. II d.3 nn.229-233, 241-246], supposes first that ‘this man’ is a ‘this’ only through matter, and second that an angel is a ‘this’ through its form.

78. Likewise, when in the major is taken “What participates in some nature does not produce another like itself in that nature save by applying the nature to something else,” then: - Either this is for the reason that the nature must be participated by the product, and then, from the fact that the nature is participated by it, something must be presupposed to which the nature is applied. And then it would follow that God could not create an angel: First because an angel would participate ‘being’ and so something must be presupposed to which ‘being’ might be applied, which is against the idea of creation. Second because, as the proof of the major shows [n.76], the product would have to be a

‘this’ through what was presupposed; but, according to them [Aquinas and his followers] an angel cannot be a ‘this’ through anything that is presupposed, because it is a ‘this’ through its form. Therefore, the reason the major is true cannot be because the nature to be communicated is participated by the product.

79. Or if, alternatively, it be said that the major is true is because the nature communicating the nature participates in the nature [n.76], this cannot be the reason, because nothing is presupposed to the being itself in that very agent (for otherwise the producer itself could not be created). Therefore, neither is it necessary that anything such be presupposed in what is made like the producer in being.

80. Again, being is participated either as some act different from essence, or as the same as essence or as the first act of the thing.

If in the first way, no proof is given that the product cannot create, for although being presupposes something in which it is received, yet essence presupposes nothing; and so, although what participates being is not created as to being, there is no proof that it could not be created as to the substance or essence that is presupposed.

If in the second way, even less is the proposed conclusion got that being cannot be created and cannot be so by what participates being just as by something else. For in things here below each individual participates the nature of the species, and yet this nature can be the first term of production in one individual and the principle of producing in another individual. And that matter is presupposed in this case is not on account of the nature to be participated, but because the form, which is part of the participated nature, is a material form.

2. Scotus’ own Argument, Drawn from Three Propositions

81. Setting this response aside then [n.76], I argue against Avicenna on the basis of three propositions. The first of these is that ‘no accidental act is necessarily required in that which creates a substance as something that necessarily precedes the term of creation’. The second is that ‘the intellection of an angel is accidental to an angel’. From these two follows that intellection is not necessarily required in an angel previous to the creation of substance. The third proposition is that ‘for producing anything outside an angel, the intellection of the angel as something preceding is necessarily required’. And there follows the initial point intended, namely that ‘no substance can be created by an angel’.

a. The First Proposition

82. The proof of the first proposition is that the act (necessarily preceding the term of creation) is required either as an act productive of the term or as the formal initial productive of the term (an example of the first: heating in respect of heat generated in wood; an example of the second: heat in the fire in respect of the heating of the wood).

83. But the act is not required in the first way, because an act productive of something and a formal productive act are in the same thing; so an act immanent to the agent as a productive act is not required to produce anything outside.

84. Nor is the act required in the second way [n.82], because an accidental act cannot be the formal initial of producing a substance.

First because an accident necessarily requires, in its existing, a receptive potency [sc. a substance able to receive it]; but every form requiring a receptive potency necessarily requires, if it is active, a passive potency in its acting, otherwise the form terminating the action would be more removed from matter than the form is that is the principle of the action - and this is unacceptable because removal from matter argues perfection; but the formal term of action cannot be more perfect than the formal principle of acting.

Second because accident is more imperfect than substance, from Metaphysics 7.1.1028a29-36; but nothing is a formal principle of producing a thing more perfect than itself. For if it is a univocal producer it is equally perfect, and if it is an equivocal one it must be more perfect. But never can something more imperfect than the product produce something more perfect than itself.

85. [Objections and their solution] - A response is made here that an accident can be the principle of producing a substance by virtue of a substance, because it is an instrument of a substance - though it cannot do so by its own virtue (an example from heat, which is an instrument of the soul in generating flesh, On the Soul 2.4.416b27-29).

86. Against this: every instrument, or anything acting in virtue of another, either attains the initial effect or disposes for the initial term of the act. But neither of these is given in the matter at issue. For an accident cannot attain the effect of the initial agent, namely an agent creating a substance, because if the initial agent were a univocal agent it would not necessarily require any agent intermediary between its form and its effect. But an equivocal agent is more perfect than a univocal one. Therefore, it does not necessarily require such an intermediary, and consequently does not have an instrument through which to attain the term. Nor can an accident serve as preceding disposition, because creation presupposes nothing that is disposed to it.

87. A confirmation of this [n.86] is that where accidents are instruments for generating a substance, they do not reach the initial term but only a certain disposition on the way to it, as is plain of the alterative qualities of the elements, which do not attain the substantial form. Otherwise quality would be a principle that acts immediately on the matter [sc. prime matter] that is receptive of substantial form, which is unacceptable because quality can only be received in a substance composite in its existence [sc. composite of matter and act]. Neither then can an accident act save on a composite substance and so not on pure matter.

88. Hereby is plain the answer to the point about heat in On the Soul [n.85]: for heat is called an instrument of the soul in the generation of animated flesh in so far as it is a principle for alteration in an alteration that is previous to generation - and not because, in the instant of generation, it reaches the form of flesh as its term, just as neither does it reach the substantial matter of flesh as its passive object.

89. Against this response [nn.86-88] an objection is raised based on Metaphysics 7.7.1032a13-14, b1,11-12, that “The house outside is made by the house in the mind.” And yet ‘the house outside’ has the being of a house more truly than ‘the house in the mind’, for the ‘house in the mind’ has diminished being in respect of ‘the house outside’, just as a known being is diminished in respect of real being. Therefore, a more imperfect thing (namely something having being in knowledge) can be the principle for producing something more perfect.

90. And this example is applied to the issue at hand as follows: as the house in the mind is related to the house outside, so is an angel (in the actual knowledge of an angel) related to an angel outside. But, according to the Philosopher [n.89], the house outside is made by the house in the mind. Therefore, from an angel that is in another angel’s intellect as known, that same angel can come to be outside.

91. It is not then the accidentality of angelic knowledge that prevents the creation of an understood substance.

92. To the first objection [n.89], then, I say that it is one thing to speak of a truer or more perfect ‘being simply’ and another thing to speak of a truer or more perfect ‘being of this sort’. For a stone in the divine mind has ‘being simply’ more truly and more perfectly than the stone outside, because a known object is said to have the being that knowledge itself has. Hence Augustine on John 1.3-4, tr.1 n.16, “What was made in him was life,” says ‘the thing known is creative life in the Word’, and this because the Word’s knowledge is really creative life. For what is said objectively of the thing known must be really found in the knowledge itself. But a stone in the divine intellect does not have a truer being of stone than the stone outside does, otherwise something intrinsic really to God would be formally and properly a stone.

93. To the issue at hand: the house in the intellect of the artisan is said to have the being that the knowledge itself of the house formally has; but, as it is, knowledge is simply more perfect than the form of the house outside, because the knowledge is a certain natural perfection of the soul; and the form of the house outside is either not real or, if it is, is much more imperfect than the knowledge is.

94. So, therefore, the answer to the first argument [n.89] is plain, that the house outside is said to come to be from the house in the mind, for it comes to be from the knowledge of the house in the mind as from the formal principle; and this knowledge of the house is simply more perfect than the house outside. Also the house inside, to the extent it participates in the being of cognition, is more perfect than itself outside.

95. And when it is said that the house inside is a diminished being and the house outside is a real being [n.89], I say that the knowledge of it is a real being and a more perfect being than the house outside. The house in the mind also participates objectively a more noble real being than is the being outside.

96. And in this way is to be understood the remark of Augustine On the Trinity 11 ch.11 n.6, that “a superior thing has a nobler being in itself than in the intellect, and conversely an inferior thing has a nobler being in the intellect than in itself.” This is to be understood of the being that belongs formally to knowledge itself, and by participation to the known thing. It is, however, true that the house outside has a truer being of house than the house in anyone’s intellect, but this is ‘being in a certain respect’, that is, a limited such being; but it has a simply nobler being in the intellect, above all in the divine intellect.

97. From this is plain the answer to the argument by similarity [n.90]; for I deny the similarity, because although the knowledge of a house is nobler than the house outside, yet the knowledge of an angel is not nobler than the angel is in himself, because an accident is not nobler than a substance.

98. And if you argue that it is similar, because the object on both sides is disposed in a similar way to the knowledge of it: ‘for it is of a nature to be the cause of its knowledge (namely the house cause of knowledge of itself as an angel cause of knowledge of himself), but a cause (if it is an equivocal one) is more perfect than its effect’. And likewise: ‘a house is the measure of the understanding of itself as an angel is the measure of an understanding of himself, but a measure is more perfect than the thing measured, for the measured depends on the measure and not conversely, Metaphysics 5.15.1021a29-30’ - I reply that a house is not of a nature to have, as to the above conditions (namely ‘to be cause’ or ‘to be measure’ of knowledge), the idea of an object in respect of knowledge of it, because an intellect that is moved by a being or quiddity in some sensible thing is not moved by an artefact as it is an artefact, because it is not thus an entity or has a whatness. But a house is only an object as to the third condition of knowledge,The three conditions for being an object of understanding are: cause, measure, term of intellection; cf. Ord. 1 d.3 nn.477-479. ³ namely that it terminates the act of knowing, and this condition of an object does not indicate a greater perfection in the object than in the act of knowing it.

99. And if you ask ‘what then is the object that is causative and measure of the knowledge of a house or of some other artefact?’, I reply that it is some natural entity or entities, whereby the intellect is moved to knowing the order or figure that the artefact adds to the natural entity. But an angel is in every way the object of knowledge of itself in the intellect of another angel; and for this reason a house can come to be from the knowledge of itself but not an angel from a knowledge of itself.

100. And hence is evident the invalidity of the argument, ‘a known object has diminished being, but the object outside has being simply and real being, so the object inside cannot be the principle of producing the object outside’ (or: ‘therefore the known thing inside cannot be the principle of knowing the known thing outside’). Yet this argument does really prove, ‘if knowledge is less noble than the form outside, then the knower cannot, by this knowledge, know the known thing outside’.

101. If the essence of a higher angel is the reason for knowing an inferior angel, then it contains the inferior angel in its knowability and therefore also in its entity. Therefore it can produce it whole - just as if an object is natural in two ways and artificial in a third, the natural contains the artificial eminently, because it contains what contains the artificial, namely the knowledge productive of it [nn.124-125].

b. The Second Proposition

102. The second initial proposition posited abovea [n.81] is shown in this way, because in Ord. I d.2 nn.101, 106, 126 it is proved as follows: it is not repugnant to the intellect of an angel to understand distinctly anything intelligible, even if there could be infinite intelligibles and of different idea and so disparate that none of them was the principle of knowing another. For, on the basis of these posits on the part of the intelligible object, there is not found on the part of the intellect any repugnance to prevent it perfectly and distinctly understanding all of them or any one of them. But the repugnance is that the intellect of an angel should distinctly understand them through a single act of understanding if they were infinite and disparate in the way stated [here n.102]. Therefore, it is not repugnant to an angel’s intellect to have different intellections really, though it is repugnant to an angel’s substance to be different substances really. Therefore not every understanding that is possible for an angel’s intellect can be the same as its substance; therefore it is an accident.

a.a [Interpolation] But some books have it differently: if the essence of a higher angel is the reason for knowing a lower one, then it contains it in its knowability and so in its entity; therefore it can produce the whole of it - just as, if the object were natural to it in two ways and artificial in the third way, the natural contains the artificial, because it contains what contains it, namely intellection productive of it [n.101].

103. These assumptions [sc. about what is repugnant, n.102] seem plain, besides this one, that ‘it is repugnant to a single finite intellect that it could be distinctly of infinite disparate objects’.

104. But this one I prove in three ways: first from the finitude of the intellection in itself, second from the finitude of the angelic intellect, third from the finitude of the angel’s essence.

105. [From the finitude of the intellection in itself] - From the first in two ways: First as follows: a single act of understanding, if it were of infinite disparate objects, would include eminently in itself the perfections of the infinite intellections that would naturally be had with respect to those objects. But it could not contain them eminently in itself unless it were intensively infinite (as is plain, because if the intellections were infinite in their proper ideas, there would be there an infinity of perfection of different ideas, because of the objects that are posited to be infinite and disparate). So, where they exist in a more eminent manner, there would have to be some infinity there - but not an extensive infinity, because the unity of what it is contained in would take such infinity away; therefore an intensive infinity.

106. Secondly as follows: every finite act of understanding is determined to a definite intelligible or to some definite intelligibles, such that it would be repugnant to it in itself that it be of things other than them or than it. But if the act of understanding in an angel is posited with respect to disparate intelligibles (were they to exist), it would not be thus determined; therefore it would not be finite.

107. [From the finitude of the angelic intellect] - I prove it, second, on the part of the angel’s intellect as follows: Things of which there is a single act of understanding can be understood together. But a finite intellect cannot at the same time distinctly understand infinite disparate objects, because it is a mark of greater power to understand distinctly many disparate objects at the same time than to understand few. Therefore to have distinct understanding of infinite disparate objects is a mark of a power intensively infinite.

108. To this proof [n.107] the response is made that intellection is not more perfect because it is of more objects, for the understanding that compares stone to wood is not more perfect than the pure understanding of stone, and yet the comparative intellection includes the intellection of more things, because it is of compared things.

109. This response supposes something false, and from the refutation of it the truth of our proposed position becomes clear. For the intellect cannot have an understanding comparing stone to wood unless it have the reasons for knowing each object. But the pure understanding of one of the objects can be had through the reason proper to only one object.     Therefore the comparative understanding necessarily requires a greater perfection in the formal principle of understanding than pure understanding does. But the effect does not necessarily require a greater perfection in the cause unless there is a greater perfection in the effect (at least in effects of the same idea); therefore etc     .

110. [From the finitude of the angel’s essence] - The third [n.103] is proved on the part of the object, or of the reason for understanding, in two ways:

The first as follows: one understanding requires one formal objective idea of understanding and one primary object, because if there are many primary objects the understandings will be numbered according to the number of their objects, just as things measured are numbered by their numbered measures, because of their actual dependence. Therefore, there must be one object of a single intellection and one formal idea of understanding. But it cannot be other than the essence of the angelic intellect, for, as is plain, this is the primary object in the angel’s intellection and the primary idea of understanding.

111. And if this is not similar in the intellection of anything else, you will be granting several primary objects. So there must be several intellections, or one must posit that the angel’s essence is the primary object and the formal idea of understanding whatever can be understood by it. But the consequent here is false for two reasons: first because some infinite being is intelligible to this intellect, but nothing finite can be the reason for understanding perfectly an infinite object; second because nothing can be the reason for knowing several things of different idea unless it contain eminently in itself all of them according to its knowability and so according to its entity. Therefore nothing can be the principle for knowing infinite disparate things, if they exist, unless it contain those infinite things eminently in itself. Therefore the essence of an angel, since it is finite, cannot be the reason for knowing such infinite objects.

112. Thus, therefore, on the supposition of the finitude of angelic intellection and of angelic intellect and essence (from Ord. I d.2, n.102), it follows that there can be in an angel different acts really of understanding and only one substance. Therefore an angel’s understanding is not the same as his substance; therefore it is an accident [n. 102].

c. The Third Proposition

113. The third proposition is conceded by Avicenna [n.81], as is plain according to his way of positing it in his Metaphysics 9 ch.4 [n.72].

114. However this can also be made clear because a nature merely intellectual cannot produce save by understanding and willing, or by act of understanding or will (either one of them or both, I care not). Hence too a divine Person produces nothing internally or externally without an act of these same powers; for if the divine nature, as it is prior to the intellect, were a principle of producing a Person, there could be some Person in divine reality prior to the Word, and so four Persons.

115. Also if some third executive power is posited in an angel, different from intellect and will, this does not impede the intended conclusion, because nothing can be produced by this third power save in virtue of the intellect and will, for the reason that every per se agent acts for an end that it knows or to which it is directed by what knows. And thus every per se active principle which is not cognitive seems to be directed in its action by a cognitive principle. At least this fact is plain, that the third power, if it existed, would be subordinate in acting to the intellect and will, and thus nothing could be produced by it without an act of intellect or will, and the argument stands.

C. To the Arguments for the Opinion

116. To the arguments for Avicenna’s opinion:

As to the first [n.73]: the proposition ‘from a principle altogether one there cannot immediately come several things’ is false if it is understood of something altogether one in reality. For, in the case of an agent acting through intellect and will, a distinction of known things, or a distinct knowledge of several things, is sufficient for several things to be produced from it. And thus is it sufficient here, if the knowledge is the substance of the knower and is consequently not numbered - it is otherwise if the knowledge is not the substance of the operating agent, but is an accident and numbered.

17. As to the second argument [n.75], one must say that the proposition of the Philosopher is true in the case of things where it is not repugnant for the nature to be communicated by something alike in species. But not everything perfect in a species can communicate the nature, because neither is the nature itself communicable to something like itself.

118. And if you argue ‘at least those things will be more perfect that can communicate their species than those that cannot’ - I say rather that in the matter at issue they are more imperfect. For, in the matter at issue, it is because of the perfection of the nature that the nature cannot be communicated save by the most perfect agent and in a way of communicating that agrees alone with the first agent. And it is more perfect to have such a perfect nature, which because of its perfection cannot be produced save immediately by God himself, than to have a nature able, because of its imperfection, to be caused by a created nature.

III. Response to the Question

A. On the Sense of the Expressions ‘To Act Initially’ and ‘To Act Instrumentally’

119. As to the question, then, since there is a difficulty about ‘to create initially or instrumentally’ [nn.17-18], one needs for this reason to know that ‘to do something initially’ can be understood in two ways: in one way by excluding every acting superior cause, so that ‘to act initially’ in this way is to act independently of an acting superior cause; in another way ‘to act initially’ can be understood to be that an inferior cause acts through its proper and intrinsic form, although it is, in acting through its form, subordinate to an acting superior cause.

120. If an instrument is distinguished from a initial cause said in the first way, then every second cause can be said to be instrumental. But if an instrument is distinguished from a initial cause in the second way then that can be said to be an instrument which does not have in itself a form active in its own order even when depending in its action on something superior, but which only acts through the motion of some other mover, as is plain of the instruments of artisans (as axe, saw, and the like). But if an instrument is posited as a principle properly active for some term, it must have some active intrinsic form: either in its ‘settled being’ before all motion of another agent, or in its ‘becoming’ when it is wholly moved by a superior agent. For if it has an active form in neither way then in no way will it properly act [cf. Ord. II d.3 n.268].

121. For since first act is the principle of second act, what has no first act in itself active in its own order has no power for a second act in that order, otherwise anything could be posited as an instrument for anything, and one could say that God created an angel through a fly as through an instrument, which is nothing. For just as it is repugnant to some nature that it be the active principle of some actions, so it is impossible for it to be, through any power at all, a principle of those actions. For although God could absolutely create cold, yet he could not create it through heat such that heat would be, in its own order, the active principle of cold (or with any other example where there would be this sort of repugnance to acting).

122. From this is plain that if an instrument is posited as effecting some effect, it must, like a second cause, have in itself before motion an active form in its settled being - or at least it receives in the actual motion an active form by which to act in its own order of acting. And this acting must be either for the initial term or for some disposition on the way to the term, so that the following proposition is in this way universally true: ‘every instrument that is properly active either acts for some disposition on the way to the initial term or it reaches the initial term through some intrinsic form, though it does so in virtue of the initial agent’ - and this whether the intrinsic form precedes the motion of the initial agent or is only present in the instrument while it is being actually moved.

B. What One Must Think when ‘To Act Initially’ is taken

1. Nothing Other than God can, Independently of a Superior Cause, Act or Create Initially

123. As to the matter at issue it is clear that nothing other than God can act initially in every action when one takes ‘to act initially’ in the first way [n.119]. And this is plain according to the theologians, who say that God acts initially in every action [Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome].

2. Whether any Creature can Act or Create when Depending on a Superior Cause

124. But when ‘to act principally’ is taken in the second way [n.119], there is a threefold way of speaking about it.

a. The First Way of Speaking

125. One way is that the negative conclusion is held only by faith [William of Ware], because of the authorities of the saints [nn.11-14], and cannot be proved by reason. For it is not evidently clear why it should be repugnant to a creature to produce some effect whole and wholly with nothing of it presupposed, since anything in the effect is more imperfect than such an agent cause is, and so could be contained in the cause eminently, and thereby virtually and actively. - This is plain by explaining causes and effects. For that which is more perfect in form is also more perfect in matter, because form is more perfect than matter, Metaphysics 7.3.1029a20-32. Therefore, if the cause can have the form in its active virtue, it does not seem repugnant to its perfection that it should have the matter in its virtue and thus the total effect. Therefore, if the creature can have the form in its active virtue, it does not appear why it will not similarly be able to have the matter, and so the whole effect wholly. Also, if several angels could belong to the same species, as was said in Ord. II d.3 nn.227-237, it does not appear why an angel cannot produce an angel as fire produces fire, for in both cases the product has the same proportion to the producer’s perfection.

b. The Second Way of Speaking

126. In another way it is posited that the negative conclusion can be shown by reason [Thomas Aquinas, William of Ware], and this universally about any creature. For just as material and formal cause in their whole genus necessarily require each other in causing a thing in its being (for never is the form the formal cause of anything unless the matter is at the same time the material cause of the same thing), so the whole genus of efficient cause, which includes every limited efficient cause, necessarily accompanies the matter as to the ‘coming to be’ of the thing. For just as matter and form are causes in a thing’s being, so are the efficient cause and the matter causes in a thing’s coming to be. It is therefore impossible for any limited efficient cause to act to produce the effect, unless, at the same time, the matter is concurrent as a principle equally requisite for the coming to be, and in this coming to be is received the form, which is the formal term of the action and from which, as from a part, the composite is constituted that is the primary product. But God does not require concomitant matter in his action, because he is, as an unlimited agent, above the whole genus of efficient cause.

127. This response, although perhaps it states the ‘reason why’ of the conclusion (namely the limitation of the efficient cause, which determines it to require matter in its acting), yet the ‘reason why’ is not much more evident than the conclusion, as is evident from looking at it.

c. The Third Way of Speaking

128. Therefore one can say in a third way that a creature cannot create principally in the aforesaid way [n.119], namely through an intrinsic form active with respect to the term in its own order of acting.

129. [First conclusion] - And the proof of this is by reason but not one that is common to all creatures, rather by several that are specific to diverse creatures, so that the conclusion is: ‘No created merely intellectual nature can create substance’. This was proved above when refuting the opinion of Avicenna [nn.82-84], because the intellection of any such nature is an accident and it can produce nothing save by an act of understanding and willing, which would not be a necessary preceding act if it could create substance; for between a perfect active principle in a perfect supposit and a substance terminating an action, no accident is a necessary intermediary. But it is otherwise with God, whose intellection and volition are his essence, and therefore he can produce substance through his intellection and will, but a creature not so.

130. Someone will say that the points that follow are disposed in order of difficulty and probability: first that an accident in virtue of a substance, which it is not, may produce a substance (but there will be discussion of this below in d.12 nn.120-121); second that an accident inhering in a substance may produce a similar substance by virtue of the first substance as a ‘by which’ not subordinated to the first substance as superior agent, but the accident is all the active ‘by which’ of the substance; the third is that an accident is an instrumental or secondary ‘by which’ of acting, subordinate to the substance and to its ‘by which’ in order of acting, but it does not reach the term of the action of the substance.a

a.a [Interpolation] All these are denied by Scotus, who concedes only that the accident is a form ‘by which’ in a dispositive action that precedes the action of the substance (as alteration precedes generation).

131. The first of these points [n.130] is sufficiently refuted in d.12 part 2 q.3 n.13, because it is against two propositions, of which one is that ‘the formal term of passive production cannot be simply more perfect than the formal principle of acting’, and of which the other is that ‘a form which is not cannot give to anything in any way the virtue of acting in any action, just as neither can that which is not be the principle of any action’ [ibid. n.9].

132. The second of these points [n.130] is against the first proposition above [n.131], because every superior agent has its own ‘by which’ of acting in its own order; but the essential order of agents is per se found only according to the active principles in them; so if the substantial form is not any principle of acting mediately, as not immediately either, then both the first and the proximate agent in generation is the quality, and the substantial form is the formal term of passive generation;     therefore etc     .

133. It will be said that the first proposition [n.131] is only true when joining perfection to the principle of acting, and therefore to that in virtue of which it acts. But, as it is now, it acts in virtue of the substance, though the substance is not a superior agent by its own form.

134. On the contrary: where the ‘by which’ is not subordinate to another ‘by which’, nor agent subordinate to agent, then what is altogether first as also proximate in the genus of efficient cause is what it is insofar as it has the ‘by which’; and for this reason the formal term of passive production is more perfect.

135. There is a proof of the first proposition absolutely [n.131], without the gloss [n.133 ‘when joining perfection to the principle of acting...’], because an active thing is active insofar as it has the formal principle of acting, but the product is per se produced according to the formal term of the production, so that other things in both producer and produced are not that according to which the former per se produces and the latter is per se produced. Therefore the thing produced, as produced, is more perfect than the producer insofar as it is producer, and so the thing produced will, according to something of itself (namely that wherein it exceeds the producer), be effectively from nothing.

136. But the third point [n.130] is against the proposition ‘an accident does not reach the matter in acting just as neither can it perfect it in being’, which proposition is against the first and second points [n.130], because they are not valid.

137. [Second conclusion] - The second conclusion is: ‘No material form can be created by a creature’. The proof is as follows: a form that is created comes naturally from the efficient cause before it informs the matter; a material form cannot come naturally from any creature before it informs its matter or potential;     therefore etc     .

138. Proof of the major, that if the form is not naturally first, then it does not receive being from the cause save by the action whereby the subject is informed with it; but this in-forming is a change properly speaking, and so is not creation [cf. Ord. I d.5 nn.94-96, II d.4-5 nn.290-295].

139. Proof of the minor, that no creature can give to a material form absolute being in itself, that is, without the material form in-forming its potential matter; for if it could thus give being, it could also conserve being, so that such a form would, by virtue of the creature, really remain for some time without matter. Now I call a material form every form that by its nature is naturally inclined to be the act of matter, and this whether the material form is substantial or accidental.

140. [Third conclusion] - The third conclusion is, ‘No material form can be the principle for creating something’. The proof is that, just as in its being a material form presupposes the matter in which it is, so in its acting it presupposes the matter on which it acts; otherwise the term of its action would be more absolute from matter than the form itself is.

d. Final Opinion

141. From these conclusions [nn.129, 137, 140] the intended proposition follows thus:

No angel can create a substance (from the first conclusion, nn.128-129), nor any accident (from the second, nn.136-137), because an accident cannot be created by a creature. Therefore, an angel can create nothing.

142. Nor can a material substance create anything, because it cannot act save through its form (whether accidental or substantial, I care not), for although matter is some being, yet it is so low that it is not the principle of any productive action. And a material form cannot be the principle of creating anything, nor can any accident be the principle of creating (from the third conclusion, n.140); therefore a material substance cannot create.

143. Therefore neither a material nor an immaterial substance can create, nor can any accident be the principle of creating (from the third conclusion, as stated, n.140).

144. There is also a special proof to show that a material substance cannot produce matter and so, if nothing is presupposed, not the whole effect either. For when certain things in their whole genus have some order, any one of them has a like order to any other of them (an example: if whiteness in its whole species is prior to blackness, then any whiteness is prior to any blackness). A material form in its whole genus is posterior in origin to the whole of the receptive matter; so any such form is posterior to any matter. But what is posterior in origin or generation is not the principle of producing what is prior in that way; therefore a substantial material form cannot create matter.

145. A confirmation of this is that a material form depends in its being on matter; therefore it cannot in its acting be the principle of producing anything of the same idea as matter. For it seems repugnant that it should in its acting depend on anything of the same idea as the term that it produces.

e. An Objection and its Solution

146. If you object [Aquinas on Metaphysics 7 lectio 1, 2] about substantial form and the quality consequent to it that the quality follows the substantial form of the generator, and yet it is in some way cause of the substantial form of the generated thing, so that, although the substantial form and its proper quality in their whole genus have an order (for the substantial form is prior), yet not any substantial form is prior to any quality but rather the substantial form is only prior to the quality in any same substance (though quality could precede substantial form in some different substance, which same point is confirmed by Metaphysics 9.8.1049b3-50a6, about potency and act, that act simply precedes potency in time and yet potency in the same thing precedes act in time) -If you so object, I reply that any substance of the same species precedes any quality in the way that substance in its whole genus precedes quality in its whole genus, namely ‘in definition, in knowledge, and in time’ [Metaphysics 7.1.1028a31-34], that is (as far as concerns itself) in separability. And thus does substance precede the quality of the generator in three ways, though not in time in the sense of temporal and actual duration outside the cause - and the Philosopher’s understanding here is not what you suppose [n.148].

147. And when you say that the quality of the generator precedes the substance of the generated as cause precedes effect [n.146], this is false, but this sort of quality is only the cause of the quality that disposes for the substantial form of the generated thing. And to this extent is it said to be in some way cause of the thing generated, although this is meant in a very extended way.

148. The cited authority of the Philosopher [n.146] is not to the purpose, because the act that is prior in time to every potency is not some material act but a simply immaterial once, as is plain in the same place at the end of the chapter [9.8.1050b16-18]. And the argument of the Philosopher [n.146] proceeded about the act that is posterior in its whole genus to the receptive potency.

149. Similarly, the points about matter [nn.144-145] and the second conclusion [n.142] are manifest among philosophers, who have posited that a secondary order of causes is simply necessary, so that a material form cannot be produced by any agent unless the matter concurs with the agent as a necessary cause that is presupposed to the term of the production.

f. A Doubt and its Solution

150. If you ask whether one can, from the above statements [nn.141-149], get the intended conclusion about the intellective soul, I reply that whatever the philosophers thought about it, whether it is created or not, will be touched on in IV d.43 q.2 nn.20-21, about resurrection. But the intended conclusion can be shown about it from the aforesaid conclusions [nn.141-142]. For the intellective soul cannot be created by an angel (as is plain from the first conclusion, n.141), nor by any created merely intellectual nature (plain from the same conclusion); nor by any bodily substance, whether through a substantial or accidental form, because the soul is nobler than any bodily substantial or accidental form; but a more ignoble form is not an active principle for producing a more noble form [n.142].

151. Thus the intended conclusion is plain, that no creature can principally create [nn.123, 128].

C. What one Must Think about ‘To Act Instrumentally’

152. I say too that neither can a creature create instrumentally, so that it be a properly active instrument [nn.120-122]. I say so to this extent, because perhaps not every instrument is properly active (as will be stated below, n.167). For an instrument can only be active either as to a preceding disposition or as to the term itself. But in the case of creation nothing can precede that might be disposed to creation, and nothing can act for the term unless it have a form active in its own order. And although it would be able in virtue of another to attain the total effect and attain it wholly, yet such would not be any active virtue of some creature, as was shown above [nn.44-49].

D. About the Opinion of Peter Lombard

153. One must understand, however, on behalf of the opinion of the Master, Sent. IV d.5 ch.3 n.3, that if an accidental form were created (as is posited about grace and charity), some subject could well precede it that disposes for the term (as the soul precedes in this case). And although there could not be any disposition necessitating the term simply in such a subject, there can yet be a disposition necessitating the term in a certain respect, that is, by divine disposition.

154. And thus can the Master be expounded, that God could give such disposition to a minister so that he might cause some disposition in the soul that would be necessary for grace - in the way that God had universally disposed to give grace to anyone so disposed (as the organization of the body is a disposition that necessitates for the intellective soul). And this potentiality would be superior to any that is given to a minister of the Church. For no minister operates on the soul mediately or immediately, so as to make grace to be simply necessarily conferred, as was said of animation in another part [sc. of the Ordinatio, I d.17 n.146].

155. Nor should one impose on the Master that he thought God could give a minister the ability to act for grace by attaining the effect itself, because a minister has no capacity for this active virtue, for the soul is by grace or charity formally accepted by God - with a specific acceptance - as worthy of eternal life [Ord. I d.17 nn.148-153]. But a creature cannot have an active virtue for making anything of this sort worthy or accepted by God.

156. This is also plain in another way, because the end and the efficient cause have a mutual reference to each other, so that the superior agent causes an effect for the sake of a superior end. Therefore, that which immediately disposes for the ultimate end is immediately from the first efficient cause, and of this sort is grace. There is a confirmation, that if grace could be from an inferior agent, it would seem that it could be for some inferior end.

157. But these reasons are not very cogent.

The first is not [nn.153-155], because a creature can be the formal reason for such acceptance, as is admitted about charity [Ord. I d.17 nn.165-168, II d.27 nn.8-9]. There seems no reason, then, as to why it is not an effective cause.

158. The second is not [n.156], because although the first agent only acts for the ultimate end, there is no need that an inferior agent in any action act ultimately for an inferior end. For an angel, if he elicits a beatific act, does not elicit it for an inferior end ultimately. So grace, therefore, could be immediately created for the ultimate end and yet be created by an inferior agent.

IV. To the Initial Arguments

159. To the first argument [n.3] response will be given below, in q.5 of this distinction 1, n.326.

160. To the second [n.4] I say that what Augustine posits is a cause, and a more manifest one, but it is not precise.

To the confirmation [n.5] I say that even immanent actions have some passive substrate, because the power in which they are immanent is a power receptive of them.

161. To the argument about adequacy or equality [n.6] I say that there is no argument from equality of effect to cause, because it is impossible for any effect to be equal to God. But adequacy can be understood there in the sense of precise proportion, that is, ‘an effect having such proportion to the cause as no other effect can have’ (namely because it is as close as possible to the cause). If ‘non-adequacy’ is understood thus in the major, I deny it. For it is as valid as if one said ‘an effect inferior to the first possible can be produced by the supreme possible’ - which is to be denied for this reason, that an inferior cannot be whole and wholly produced save by the supreme thing.

162. To the proof of the major [n.7] I say that the agent does not produce according to the whole of its power. For there is no necessity that an agent, when it acts freely and not by necessity of nature, should produce according to the whole of its virtue as much as it could produce according to that virtue. And when it is further said that ‘then the more perfect effect would show greater perfection of the cause’ [n.7], I concede that any effect - whole and wholly produced - shows equal power in the cause, but a more perfect effect shows it more eminently (an example: if many ordered conclusions follow from the same principle, the whole truth of the principle is the cause of the truth of each of the conclusions, and yet one of the conclusions is truer than another and more eminently shows the truth of the principle).

163. To the other argument about ‘annihilate’ [n.8] I say that annihilation belongs only to God, because ‘to annihilate’ is not to act positively but is not to act, that is, not to conserve. But it belongs only to God to conserve the whole creature and conserve it wholly. And in brief: just as any creature requires in its becoming a cause co-causing with it, namely the potential principle, so it has no power over it to destroy it as neither to produce it, and consequently it necessarily leaves something behind just as it necessarily presupposes something. But just as creation properly speaking is production from nothing, that is, not from anything that is part of the first thing produced or that is receptive of the induced form, so annihilation is destruction to nothing in both ways.

164. To the first proof, about natural form [n.9], the answer is plain in Ord. II d.8 n.9, because although no part of the form remain, yet something receptive of form, which was something of the composite, does remain.

165. To the other proof, about the virtues [n.9], I reply that no infused virtue can be corrupted in us by any act of ours as by nature of repugnance, but only by demeriting cause. For a soul that sins deserves that grace not be conserved in it, and so, in the second instant of nature (because of such demerit as something preceding), God does not conserve grace and so grace is annihilated.

166. To the proofs about friendship and enmity [n.9] I say that by sin one is an enemy not formally but by demerit. Similarly I say to the proofs about faith and hope [n.9] that infused faith and hope are only by way of demerit corrupted by act of infidelity or despair. And if you want to have something that is corrupted by those acts as formally repugnant, I say that it is only acquired faith and hope that are so - and it is very possible for something formally repugnant to those acquired habits to be induced by our acts.

167. As to the final argument [n.10], when it is said ‘by virtue etc.’ - to understand this phrase (and those said about instruments [n.18]) one must understand that nothing can act, in any order of acting, save by its proper virtue. For as was said above [n.152], that if a thing does not have virtue as active and intrinsic form it can altogether not act, so too if it not have its own intrinsic virtue, because the form is virtue. But if it did not have form or virtue before and it is now acting in some order, it must be that now it have de novo an active form and virtue in that order. For the same nature, remaining without any change, can in no way now be active and now non-active.

168. But nevertheless ‘an agent dependent on another’ is said to act in virtue of that other, because the virtue of a dependent agent does not suffice without the virtue on which it depends. However, an instrument is more said to act in virtue of another than a second cause is, for that thing depends more on a superior agent which does not have an active form in its being, but receives in actually being moved as much of it as that has which has the active form in its settled being.

169. Also, for a second cause - that is a cause that has an active form in its settled being - to act in virtue of another is not for it then to receive something from that other, but only for it to have an order inferior to that other agent in its own order at the same time. But for an instrument - that is something that receives an active form in being moved - to act in virtue of another is for it then actually to receive a form from that by which it acts.

170. And from this is plain that when a first cause and a second cause properly speaking act together, there is from the first cause to the second cause no new influence that is the creation of anything inhering in the second cause; rather the influence there is a determinate order of those causes in bringing about the common effect. But an instrument, when it acts, properly receives an influence from that of which it is the instrument, because it receives actual motion and, in the motion, a form by which it acts in its own order.

171. From these is plain how to understand the major [n.10]. For it is very true that a second cause and an instrument can do more in virtue of another than in their own (supply: sole) virtue when one prescinds from the virtue of the other. For their virtue is properly diminished and subordinate to the other virtue, so that without that other virtue acting, their virtue has no power for the effect. Yet they cannot do more in virtue of another than in their own virtue, that is, do something to which their virtue in no way extends itself in their own order of causing.

172. But now the minor [n.10], if it assume their own virtue prescinding from the virtue of the superior cause, is false. For a creature can do nothing without the virtue of God acting more principally.

173. For this reason the argument is not valid.